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TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES AND CREDITORS
RIGHTS IN MARYLAND
By BRIDGEWATER M. ARNOLD*
Maryland is one of the states in the Union which has
preserved and protected the common law estate of tenancy
by the entireties. In Marbury v. Cole,' Judge Alvey said:
"By the common law of England, which is the law
of this State, except where it has been changed or
modified by statute, a conveyance to husband and wife
does not constitute them joint tenants, nor are they
tenants in common. They are in the contemplation
of the common law, but one person, and hence they
take, not by moieties, but the entirety. They are each
seised of the entirety, and the survivor takes the whole.
As stated by Blackstone, 'husband and wife being con-
sidered as one person in law, they cannot take the
estate by moieties, but both are seized of the entirety,
per tout, et non per my; the consequence of which is,
that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of
any part without the assent of the other, but the whole
must remain to the survivor.' 2 Bl. Com. 182.' 1
This legal conception that husband and wife are but one
person was characterized by Mr. Justice Sutherland in
Tyler v. United States2 as an "amiable fiction".
A prerequisite to this type of tenancy is, that the owners
of the estate are husband and wife. The immunities of
* A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LL.B., 1931, University of Maryland.
Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, University of Maryland School of
Law.
149 Md. 402 (1878).
Ibid, 411.
'281 U. S. 497 (1930).
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tenancy by the entireties can be enjoyed only by a lawfully
married pair.'
There have been cases in Maryland where property was
held by a man and woman, who purported to be husband
and wife, as tenants by the entireties, but where in fact
there was no valid marriage because the woman was mar-.
ried at the time of the second marriage ceremony, but that
was unknown to the man.4 In one of these cases, Mitchell
v. Frederick, although there was no legal relationship of
husband and wife, nevertheless, the court gave the owner-
ship of the property some of the attributes of a tenancy
by the entireties in order to carry out the intention of the
parties. Upon the death of the purported wife, her children
by her first marriage filed a bill for the settlement of the
property rights. The Court of Appeals in deciding that
the deceived man was entitled to the property said:
"The form in which it is manifested opposing no
obstacle, can the impossibility of conveying the tenan-
cies by the entireties named, with the peculiar immuni-
ties allowed to husband and wife in such tenancies,
render the grants ineffectual to convey even the inci-
dents which may be included in other tenancies or
joint holdings? Not, it would seem, so long as the
grants are to be given any effect at all to convey
plural ownership, for if they convey it there would be
no reason why they should not convey it in the form
and character intended, with the same rights as be-
tween the parties themselves, but without the immuni-
ties that would be permitted to husband and wife."6
It probably can be assumed that in any of the cases
where there was no actual relationship of husband and
wife but the Court treated the property as a joint tenancy
in order to carry out as far as possible the intentions of the
parties as between themselves, a creditor of either the
man or the woman could have reached the individual's in-
3 Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 A. 733 (1934) ; Hutson v. Hutson,
168 Md. 182, 177 A. 177 (1935).
SSupra, n. 3. See also Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 A. 635 (1923).
8 Supra, n. 3.
0upra, n. 3, 51.
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terest during the lifetime of both. The last clause of the
above quoted statement would seem to so indicate.
Maryland follows the rule that a conveyance or devise
to a husband and wife will ordinarily create a tenancy by
the entireties unless there is an intention, clearly expressed
in the instrument, that they shall take as tenants in com-
mon or as joint tenants.7
Personal property, as well as real property, may be
owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties.8
An equitable interest in property may be owned as tenants
by the entireties.9
When husband and wife and a third party have an
ownership in property together it is possible to have a
dual situation of a tenancy by entireties and a tenancy in
common present at the same time. In Haid v. Haid,10 a
motor boat was registered in the name of the husband and
wife and also in the name of the husband's son by a former
marriage. The Court said:
"After a full and careful consideration of this evi-
dence, it was, we think, legally sufficient to be sub-
mitted to the jury for its consideration, tending to show
that the interest or estate held by her [the wife] in
the property in question is that of tenant by the en-
tireties with her husband, to the extent of an undivided
one-half interest in the boat, the other undivided one-
half interest being held by Robert E. Haid [the son],
and, as between him and William J. Haid and wife,
they were tenants in common.""
A creditor of one spouse only, cannot execute upon prop-
erty owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entire-
Wolf v. Johnson, 157 Md. 112, 145 A. 363 (1929) (real property) ; Young
v. Cookman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A. (2d) 428 (1943) (shares of stock).8Funds deposited in bank-Baker v. Baker, 123 Aid. 32, 90 A. 776 (1914),
Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901) ; motor boat-Haid v.
Haid, 167 Md. 493, 175 A. 338 (1934); rent-Banking and Trust Co. v.
Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157 (1933) ; leasehold-Masterman v. Masterman,
129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916), Davis v. Harris, 170 Md. 610, 185 A. 469
(1936) ; judgment-Clark v. Wootton, 63 Md. 113 (1885) ; mortgages and
notes-Whitelock v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115, 143 A. 712 (1928). See also
Katzenstein, Joint Savings Bank Accounts in Maryland (1939) 2 Md.
L. R. 109. 129.
'Meyers v. Loan and Say. Assn., 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453 (1922).11 Supra, n. 8.
21 Supra, n. 8, 498. See also Tazer v. Tazer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163 (1932).
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ties, at least not during the lifetime of the other spouse."
Nor is it subject to a mechanic's lien for a debt contracted
by husband alone."3
A creditor holding the joint obligation of a husband and
wife, upon reducing his claim to judgment will have a lien
on real property or certain leasehold interests held by the
husband and wife as tenants by the entireties in the juris-
diction wherein the judgment was obtained. 4 By the same
token, such a creditor should be able to attach or subject
to execution a similar interest in personal property.
The Maryland Constitution15 and the so-called Married
Women's Property 5 a Acts have wrought changes in the
common law rule that a husband by virtue of his control
of the wife's property was entitled to all the income there-
from, which in turn could be made subject to the claims
of his creditors. 6 The result of these Constitutional and
statutory provisions is, that while they do not affect the
quantity of the estate, they have progressively enlarged
the dominion of the wife over her own property during
her husband's life and have deprived a creditor of the
husband from being able to attach income derived from
property held as tenants by the entireties. 7 The earlier
case of Jordan v. Reynolds,' indicated the same result. The
law now exempts the husband's right to the income from
attachment, for the sake of the wife, it protects him, because
thereby it can most efficiently protect her. 9
While the income from property held as tenants by the
entireties is exempt from seizure by the creditor of a
spouse, nevertheless, we find the Court of Appeals, as be-
12 Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 288, 66 A. 37 (1907) ; Ades v. Caplin, 132
Md. 66, 103 A. 94 (1918) ; Keen v. Keen, 60 A. (2d) 200 (Md. 1948).
"3Blenard v. Blenard, 185 Md. 548, 45 A. (2d) 335 (1946).
11 Frey v. McGaw, 127 Md. 23, 95 A. 960 (1915).
'5 MD. CONST., Art. 3, Sec. 43: "The Property of the wife shall be protected
from the debts of the husband."
1" Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sees. 1, 2.
16 Clark v. Wootton, supra, n. 8; Masterman v. Masterman, supra, n. 8;
Whitelock v. Whitelock, supra, n. 8; Schilback v. Schilback, 171 Md. 405,
189 A. 432 (1937).
t7 Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, supra, n. 8.
105 Md. 288, 66 A. 37 (1907).
9Clark v. Wootton, supra, n. 8; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878);
Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167 (1916); Whitelock v. Whitelock,
supra, n. 8. See also 166 A. L. R. 969, et seq.
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tween the spouses themselves, really treating this income
more as a tenancy in common. In the recent case of Elko
v. Elko,10 where the wife was living separate from her hus-
band, the Court held that a husband and wife are entitled
equally to share the income, such as rents, from entireties
property. This result was foreshadowed in Masterson v.
Masterson." With this view of the income, it could be
argued that the individual creditor of one of the spouses
should be able to reach his share of the income although
not more than his share. Such, however, is not the law in
Maryland.
In 1885, the Court of Appeals held that where husband
and wife obtained a judgment against a transit company
for injuries to the wife, a judgment creditor of the husband
could not attach the judgment against the company. This
in effect treated this judgment as if it were held by husband
and wife as tenants by the entireties. 22
When a former wife holding judgment against her ex-
husband sought to execute on a motor boat, it was held
that the second wife, having an interest in the boat as
tenant -by the entireties, had a right to intervene as a
claimant of property. 2 If, however, a husband and wife
own property, not as tenants by the entireties, but merely
as joint tenants then the joint tenant's interest is appar-
ently subject to execution by a creditor of one of the joint
tenants.4
In the leading Maryland case of Jordan v. Reynolds,25
the defendant had entered into a contract to purchase lease-
hold property from a husband and wife which they held
as tenants by the entireties. Defendant refused to go
through with the purchase on the ground that the contract
49 A. (2d) 441 (1946).
Supra, n. 8.
=Clark v. Wootton, supra, n. 8. This decision was rendered in the days
when a married woman had to be joined with her husband as plaintiff to
sue in tort. In this connection see Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 5; see
also Elko v. Elko, supra, n. 20.
Haid v. Haid, supra, n. 8.
21 Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13 (1882) ; McElderry v. Flannigan, 1 H. & G.
308 (1827) ; Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs. 159, 244.
Supra, n. 18.
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called for a merchantable title and that there was a judg-
ment of record against the husband. Husband and wife filed
a bill for specific performance. In affirming the decree
granting specific performance, the Court of Appeals said:
"The law is well settled in this State that judgments
create liens only because the land is made liable by
statute to be seized and sold on execution.. A judgment
creditor stands in the place of his debtor and he can
only take the property of his debtor subject to the
charges to which it was justly liable in the hands of
the debtor at the time of the rendition of the judgment.
Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187; Morton v. Grafton, 68
Md. 545; Hartstock v. Russell, 52 Md. 619.
"An execution is a lien on personal property only
because the personal property can be sold in satisfac-
tion of the execution. Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71;
Hanson v. Barnes, 3 G. & J. 359; Harris v. Alcock, 10
G. & J. 226.
"It seems therefore to be clear both upon reason
and authority that the judgment in this case is not a
lien upon the property, in the lifetime of the wife.
There is nothing that can be seized and sold under
execution upon the judgment. Property held by this
tenure cannot be sold without the joinder of the wife,
McCubbin v. Stanford, supra, and the judgment credi-
tor can acquire no greater rights than those possessed
by the judgment debtor. Valentine v. Seiss, supra;
Clark v. Wooten, supra; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402;
Samarzevosky v. City Pass. Co., 88 Md. 479.
"The case of Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Indiana, 391,
is an express decision on this point. The Court said,
there can be no partition between tenants by the en-
tireties, while such an estate exists, no interest in it
can be sold on execution for the debts of the husband
or wife. From the nature of the estate and the legal
relation of the parties, there must be unity of estate,
unity of possession, unity of control and unity in con-
veying or encumbering it. A mortgage upon such an
estate executed by the husband alone is void....
"The result of a decision according to the appellant's
(purchaser) contention, would practically destroy the
wife's estate and turn her entirety into a joint tenancy
or tenancy in common with the purchaser, under either
a mortgage sale, or a sale under an execution, on a judg-
ment.
296 [VOL. IX
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"An insuperable objection to the position urged by
the appellant, here is the provision of our Constitution
(sec. 43, Art. 3), which declares that the property of
the wife shall be protected from the debts of the
husband. If the judgment creditor possesses a lien
against this property, he could collect the debt by an
execution, take away the wife's property without her
consent, and thereby destroy the nature of the estate
as it now stands.
"To hold the judgment to be a lien at all against
this property, and the right of execution suspended
during the life of the wife, and to be enforced on the
death of the wife, would we think likewise encumber
her estate, and be in contravention of the constitutional
provision heretofore mentioned, protecting the wife's
property from the husband's debts.
"It is clear, we think, if the 'judgment here is de-
clared a lien, but suspended during the life of the
wife and not enforceable until her death, if the hus-
band should survive the wife, it will defeat the sale
here made, by the husband and wife to the purchaser,
and thereby make the wife's property liable for the
debts of her husband. 26
A point to be considered is, what is the effect of a
judgment standing against a husband whose wife subse-
quently predeceases her husband, they having owned real
property as tenants by the entireties. The effect of the
wife's death is to leave the husband as the sole owner of
the property, free to dispose of it as he sees fit. This
being so, it follows that upon the wife's death the property
could be taken on execution by a judgment creditor. The
language of Jordan v. Reynolds is: "The law is well settled
in this State that judgments create liens only because the
land is made liable by statute to be seized and sold on
execution," 27 and it would seem authority for this. This
being so, it would appear then, that immediately upon the
SIbid, 294.
"Ibid, 294, 295: "To hold the judgment to be a lien at all against this
property, and the right of execution suspended during the life of the wife,
and to be enforced on the death of the wife, would we think likewise
encumber her estate, and be in contravention of the constitutional provision
heretofore mentioned, protecting the wife's property from the husband's
debts."
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death of the wife any judgment of record would immedi-
ately become a lien on the surviving husband's real estate.
If more than one judgment of record is outstanding against
the husband, the question arises whether or not these judg-
ments should be regarded as creating liens adhering to the
land simultaneously upon the wife's death so as to be
treated as standing upon an equal footing as regards pri-
ority. The result then should be that the creditors should
share pro rata in any proceeds from an execution sale of
the property. The language in Jordan v. Reynolds, would
seem to lend some basis to the proposition that the liens
of the judgments should adhere simultaneously. However,
it seems more likely that in Maryland it would be held
that as between the judgment creditors themselves, the
judgment first of record will be given priority over the
later judgment, according to the reasoning in Messenger
v. Eckenrode.28 In this case, involving the question of pri-
ority of judgment liens upon after-acquired property of
the judgment debtor, the Court of Appeals gave priority
to the judgments in their order of time.
Another question could arise on the following hypo-
thetical facts: H and W, own real estate as tenants by the
entireties. J in 1940 obtains a judgment of record against
H. In 1943, H and W execute a mortgage on the property
to M to secure a loan, the mortgage to become due and pay-
able March 1, 1948. On February 1, 1947, W dies, and at
the time of her death the mortgage is not in default. Sub-
sequently the mortgage being in default, M forecloses. Will
J's judgment lien have priority over the mortgage lien? It
would seem that the mortgage should have priority. To
hold otherwise would interfere with the wife's estate dur-
ing her lifetime. If the husband and wife can sell property
which they hold as tenants by the entireties free from
any possible lien which a judgment creditor of the hus-
band alone could assert, as was held in Jordan v. Reynolds, 29
they should likewise be able to mortgage the property with
= 162 Md. 63, 158 A. 357 (1932).
SSupra, n. 18.
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equal freedom. The reasoning of Jordan v. Reynolds, should
be decisive on this point.3 0
The effect of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on property
held by the spouses as tenants by the entirety is to change
the estate by entireties, by operation of law, into a tenancy
in common,31 which can be partitioned. In Reed v. Reed,3 2
which involved an absolute divorce, the Court quotes Mr.
Bishop as to the effect of a divorce a mensa: "This divorce
does not at common law and without statutory aid, change
the relation of the parties as to property."33 It would seem
to follow therefore, that if there is an absolute divorce
any outstanding judgment against a spouse should become
a lien upon his, or her, interest as a tenant in common in
real property, which prior to the decree of divorce, had
been owned by them as tenants by the entireties. Like-
wise, such converted tenancy in common should become
immediately an available asset for any creditor of the
spousesa This result should not follow, however, if the
divorce is merely a mensa et thoro.
In the event of the bankruptcy of one of the spouses,
if there is a divorce a vinculo within six months after the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the bankrupt spouse's
interest in property held as tenants by the entireties having
been converted into a tenancy in common should, under
Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act," pass to the trustees
'"It might be noted that where entireties property is subject to a Mort-
gage executed by the husband and wife and subsequently the husband dies.
the general rule as to exoneration of the mortgage debt out of the personal
assets of the deceased mortgagor does not apply. However, apparently, the
survivor is entitled to assert or claim for proportionate contribution against
the estate of the deceased husband as co-principal. Cunningham v. Cun-
ningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444 (1930).
" Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909) ; Meyers v. Last End Loan
and Savings Association, 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453 (1922) ; Blenard v. Blenard,
185 Md. 548, 45 A. (2d) 335 (1946) ; Gunter v. Gunter, 49 A. (2d) 454
(Md. 1946) ; Keen v. Keen, 8upra, n. 12.
Supra, n. 31.
3 In the recent case of Keen v. Keen, tupra, n. 12, the Court of Appeals
stated: "The bill of complaint asks for a divorce a nmensa which, if granted,
would not affect the title to the property held by the parties as tenants by
the entireties."
" Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, See. 127A authorizes, when one spouse
has been adjudicated a lunatic, a sale of entirety property by court order
upon petition of committee or other spouse, and division of proceeds as Court
may find proper. Query: Does this statute create a potential asset for the
individual creditor of one of the spouses?
"11 U. S. C. A. 110.
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in bankruptcy as part of the bankrupt's estate. This section
of the Bankruptcy Act provides: "All property in which
the bankrupt has at the date of bankruptcy an estate or
interest by the entirety and which within six months after
bankruptcy becomes transferable in whole or in part solely
by the bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so trans-
ferable, vest in the trustee and his successor and successors,
if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, as
of the date of bankruptcy."85 So also, if the bankrupt's
spouse should die within the six month's period it would
appear that the surviving spouse's interest as sole owner
would pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. A contrary result
was reached in Dioguardi v. Curran.6 It must be noted,
however, that this decision was rendered before the above
quoted amendment to Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act
was enacted in 1938.37
Interesting questions may arise'8 if, after the petition
in bankruptcy is filed against a' husband, he and his wife
convey property which they own as tenants by the en-
tireties to a third person purchaser and then subsequently,
but before six months from the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, the wife of the bankrupt dies. What is the
position of the purchaser? Is his purchase subject to a
right of the trustee to claim this property in the event the
wife dies within six months; in other words, does this pro-
vision of the Act operate something in the nature of a
lis pendens? So to hold, would obviously cut down the
marketable value of the property during the six months
period to the detriment of the wife, for the possible benefit
of the husband's creditors. Such a result would seem to
be contrary to the Maryland Constitutional protection of
married women's property from the creditors of the hus-
band as expounded by the Court of Appeals in Jordan v.
Reynolds.s9 Also, looking to the purpose of the six month
0"Date of bankruptcy" means the date when the petition was filed, see
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 1 (13), 11 U. S. C. A. 1.
335 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
- Circa, n. 34.
The writer has failed to find any decisions as yet dealing directly with
these questions.
S"upra, n. 12.
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provisions in Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, added
in 1938, it would seem that the purpose was to prevent the
unseemly haste by a person, about to inherit property be-
cause of the imminent death of the owner, to file a petition
in bankruptcy in order to block out the petitioner's credi-
tors before the expectant property becomes available to
satisfy their claims.4 1 It would not seem that its purpose
was in any way intended to affect adversely the rights and
interests in property of persons other than the bankrupt.
Accordingly, it is the writer's present opinion that the
purchaser of entireties property at any time after the peti-
tion is filed should be protected from any claim that might
arise out of the six months provision in Section 70a of the
Bankruptcy Act. It might be quite possible, however, for
a court to hold that the six months provision now applies
to the proceeds, or the right to the proceeds from the pur-
chaser, in lieu of the property sold.4'
A more difficult problem would arise under the six
months provision of Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act if,
after the petition in bankruptcy is filed against the husband,
he and his wife convey entirety property to a straw man42
who reconveys to the wife. No consideration being paid by
the wife as sole owner and then subsequently, but before
the six months period expires, the wife dies. Could the
trustee in bankruptcy claim this property as an asset of
the bankrupt estate? In the absence of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, under the ruling in Hertz v. Mills,43 referred to
subsequently in this article, such a conveyance would not
be deemed a fraud on the husband's creditors. Are there
any provisions in the Bankruptcy Act that should enable
the trustee to recapture this property as an asset of the
bankrupt estate? It seems to the writer that the possibly
40 See In re Hall, 16 Fed. Supp. 18 (W. D. Tenn., 1936), for a case decided
prior to the amendments.
"' In this connection see Brell v. Brell, supra, n. 4; Tait v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 70 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), where the proceeds from
sale of entireties property was treated as creating a tenancy by the entire-
ties In the proceeds.
" The writer understands that conveyancers are reluctant to omit the
straw-man and convey directly, as apparently authorized by Md. Code
(1939) Art. 50, Sec. 15.
Is 166 Md. 492, 171 A. 709 (1934).
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applicable sections of the Act are Sections 67a (1), d;
70a (4), 70e.44
Section 67a (1) might be of some use because of the
expression "in fraud of the provisions of this Act". The
difficulty here is, that Section 67a (1) is only applicable
to liens obtained through legal or equitable process or
proceeding which is not the situation in the problem stated
above.
Section 67 (d) dealing with fraudulent conveyances
apparently is applicable only to transfers made within one
year prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. In
the problem, the transfer is made after the petition was
filed. This would appear to eliminate any usefulness of
Section 67 (d).
Section 70a (4) taken in conjunction with the introduc-
tory clause of Section 70a would appear to be applicable
only to transfers made prior to the filing of the petition,
and if this be so, it would not be useful to the trustee.
Section 70e stating that transfers fraudulent against
any creditors having provable claims under any Federal or
State law are null and void against the trustee, does not
appear to be useful to the trustee.45 Lacking provision to
be found in the Bankruptcy Act itself, the writer has not
discovered any other Federal law of which the trustee could
avail himself. As to State law, the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Hertz v. Mills46 would seem to
be conclusive that the trustee in our problem could not
attack the conveyance as void.
If the foregoing analysis is sound then it would appear
that the trustee's sole remaining basis for recovering the
property would be on the theory that any dealing in the
entireties property after the petition is filed must be subject
" 11 U. S. C. A. 107a (1), d. It is doubtful that Sec. 21g (11 U. S. C. A.
44 (g)or 70d (11 U. S. C. A. 110 (d)) would have any bearing on the
substantive question.
"Note: Sec. 70a "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his suc-
cessor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification,
shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt
as of the date of the filing of the petition In bankruptcy or of the original
petition proposing an arrangement or plan under this Act, except insofar as
it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all ... (4) property trans-
ferred by him in fraud of his creditors . . .
"Supra, n. 43.
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to the six months provision in Section 70a (8), i.e., on the
theory of a lis pendens. This theory, however, for the rea-
sons given in the discussion of the preceding problem,
would appear to be of questionable validity.
47
There have been occasional cases reaching the Court
of Appeals wherein creditors have sought to attack prop-
erty dealings involving tenancies by the entireties as frau-
dulent conveyances.
In Hertz v. Mills,48 husband and wife acquired property
in Montgomery County as tenants by the entireties in 1922.
The property was paid for with the husband's money. Some
years later, while suit against the husband in the District
of Columbia was pending, husband and wife transferred
the property which they held as tenants by the entireties
to a straw man, and he then reconveyed to the wife as sole
owner. Subsequently, the creditor having obtained a judg-
ment, he filed a bill in equity for the purpose of enforcing
his claim against the property, on the ground that the
transfers were fraudulent and had been made to defeat
the creditor in the event the husband survived the wife.
The creditor's bill did not propose that the deeds by which
the property was conveyed to the wife be annulled, but
prayed to have the title decreed to be held in trust by the
wife for the creditor in consequence of her participation
in the fraud. The defendants, husband and wife, demurred
to the bill, the demurrer was sustained by the lower
court, and that ruling was affirmed on appeal. In addition
to holding that the conveyance to the husband and wife
in 1922 could not be attacked because of Article 45, Section
19 and as no objection was raised by any subsisting creditor
I7The Bankruptcy Act provides that all property which vests in the
bankrupt within six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance shall vest in the trustee as of the date it vested in the bankrupt
Sec. 70a (8). The Court of Appeals in Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 cid.
109, 139 A. 40 (1925) held that where a husband and wife, owning lease-
hold property as tenants by the entirety, and the husband conveyed his
interest therein to her, the fact that the wife held the property as part of
her sole and separate estate during her lifetime did not bar the husband's
right to his statutory share therein at her death. Some affirmative act of
the husband was necessary to release his statutory right in his deceased
wife's estate. Query, would this statutory right come within the purview
of the six months provision concerning property vesting by bequest, devise,
or inheritance?
IsSupra, n. 43.
'Md. Code (1939).
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within three years, the Court of Appeals quoted with
approval from American Wholesale Corp. v. Aronstein:5
0
"As to the conveyance subsequently made by Aron-
stein to his wife, the estate was held by them. as tenants
by the entireties, and the appellants were not entitled
to subject the separate interest made by Aronstein to
the payment of their claims. His conveyance to his
wife accordingly could not hinder or delay them in the
collection of their judgments."'51
This would seem to be a clear holding that if a spouse
owning property as a tenant by the entireties voluntarily
transfers his interest to the mate, thus divesting himself
of the possibility by operation of law of becoming the sole
owner of the property in the event of surviving his mate,
such transfer cannot be regarded as a fraud upon his indi-
vidual creditors."2
In Davis v. Harris,53 a creditor tried to collect $383 on
a note from a husband. It was alleged that when demand
for payment was made, the husband threatened that if suit
were brought on the note he would prevent its collection
by disposing of all his property. On December 23, 1926,
(fifteen days after the note matured) the husband executed
a deed to a straw man conveying all of his estate (consisting
of two leasehold properties) and the deed was recorded
on December 28, 1926. While title was in the straw man,
the creditor filed suit on the note in January, 1927 and
obtained a judgment on January 29th. This judgment was
subsequently assigned to plaintiff. On December 23, 1927,
the straw man reconveyed the property to the husband
and wife as tenants by the entireties, and the deed was
recorded April 5, 1928. In January, 1936, plaintiff filed suit
against the husband and wife, alleging a fraudulent scheme,
and praying that plaintiff's judgment be declared a lien
- 10 F. (2d) 991 (C. A. D. C. 1926).
Ibid, 992.
w See also Warheim v. Bayliss, 149 Md. 103, 131 A. 27 (1925) where the
Court found there was no conveyance in fraud of creditors; and Robbins
v. Dorsey, 150 Md. 265, 132 A. 633 (1926) ; In Re Moore, 11 F. (2d) 62,
where conveyance was set aside for fraud; In re Nicolet, 10 F. Supp. 541
(D. Md. 1935) where discharge In bankruptcy was denied.
0 170 Md. 610, 185 A. 469 (1936).
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on the property. Defendant husband and wife demurred
on grounds of limitations and laches. A demurrer was sus-
tained by the lower court and this was affirmed on appeal.
The Court of Appeals said:
"This suit was instituted on January 17th, 1936,
nearly nine years after the completed transfer of the
properties in question to the defendant husband and
wife as tenants by the entireties. The effect of the
transfer was to vest in the wife, as well as the husband
and the entire title to the properties during their joint
lives, with the right of continued and complete owner-
ship in the surviving spouse. Such an acquisition of
property by the wife is within the purview of the
quoted statute. The limitation of time which it imposes
in absolute terms upon the rights of creditors to con-
test conveyances from husband to wife has been re-
peatedly applied.""4
To the plaintiff's contention that his judgment was en-
tered before the straw man reconveyed to the husband and
wife, the Court said:
"But the bill of complaint avers that the reconvey-
ance was in furtherance of the scheme of Harris to
hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, ' and that is
the purpose for which the deed, without consideration,
from Harris to Egner, is alleged to have been executed.
It is thus affirmed that the reconveyance was in pursu-
ance of the plan to which the original conveyance was
likewise directed. The circumstance of the delay in
the intended re-transfer does not neutralize the effect
upon the plaintiff's case of the fact that the judgment
debtor had conveyed his property, by a duly recorded
deed, before the institution of the suit of which the
judgment was procured. The object of this proceeding
in equity is to enforce the judgment creditor's claim'
as against an estate in which the wife of the judgment
debtor acquired an interest from the husband through
a consummating deed recorded more than three years
before the plaintiff's rights in opposition to it were
thus asserted. It is assumed and declared by the bill
that such a proceeding is requisite for the enforcement
of the plaintiff's claim against the property conveyed
M5by the deeds in controversy. ...
Ib £4, n. 53, 613.
Ibd, n. 53, 614.
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One of the things of interest in this case is that (assum-
ing the conveyance from the husband to the straw man to
be fraudulent as to creditors as alleged) it was not decided
because of the fact, if true, that the creditor's judgment
when entered up became a lien on the property while title
to it was in the name of the straw man. A question arises
as to whether or not the judgment creditor would have
been more successful if he had proceeded directly, without
first going into equity, to have the property sold by the
sheriff under Article 39B, Section 9 (b). This would then
leave the purchaser at the execution sale subsequently to
try the title to the property in an action at law, such as,
ejectment proceedings56 against the husband and wife.57
It is to be noted that the language of Article 45, Section
1,58 protects all transfers of property from spouse to spouse
from the creditors of either grantor spouse except where
made to the prejudice of subsisting creditors who may at-
tack the conveyance within three years.5 9
Sections 5, 6 and 760 of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act enacted in Maryland in 1920 provide that
there may be conveyances, not only fraudulent as to sub-
sisting creditors, but also fraudulent as to future creditors.
These sections on their face would apply to conveyances
between spouses as well as conveyances between other per-
"Welch v. Scotten, 59 Md. 72 (1882).
"Would Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 1, be a bar to such a proceeding
after three years? See Brasie v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 87 Minn. 456,
92 N. W. 340 (1902).
68 Md. Code (1939). A creditor may be barred by laches in period shorter
than three years, Ahrenberg v. Brown, 153 Md. 598, 139 A. 280 (1927).
51In Stieff Co. v. Ullrich, 110 Md. 629, 73 A. 874 (1909) a creditor of
the husband sought to set aside a deed taken by the husband in the name
of the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties more than three
years after the execution and recordation of the deed. The creditor sought
to avoid the running of Art. 45, Sec. 1, on the ground that he had just
recently discovered the alleged fraud. The Court indicated that under
certain circumstances this might defer the running of the statute, quoting
from Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257, (1877), that "when a party has been
injured by the fraud of another, and such fraud is concealed, or is of
such character as to conceal itself, whereby the Injured party remains in
ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence on his part, the bar
of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though
there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party com-
mitting the fraud to conceal It from the knowledge of the other party."
Here, however, the Court found that the creditor did not exercise diligence,
and that there was no concealment, and they refused to rule that the
statute of limitations had not begun to run promptly.
0Md. Code (1939) Art. 39B, Secs. 5, 6. 7.
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sons. However, Article 45, Section 1,11 in transfers between
spouses, specifically permits only those to be attacked
which are in prejudice of the rights of subsisting creditors.
The conflict between Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act and Article 45, Section 1, is
resolved in favor of Article 45, Section 1, by the express
terms of Section 14 of the Uniform Act which provides:
".. . nothing herein shall be construed to repeal . . . the
law relating to fraudulent conveyances from husband to
wife as contained in Article 45, Sections 1, 2 and 11 of said
Code . . ."
Therefore, under the present state of the statutory law
of Maryland it may be conceivable that a husband may at
any time defeat his future creditors and render nugatory
the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act by conveying his property to his wife
or to himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties. A
court decision on this point of statutory construction would
be of interest.
Where by a prenuptial contract, the prospective hus-
band agreed, in consideration of marriage, to convey prop-
erty which he owned to his prospective wife and himself
as tenants by the entireties, the transaction was upheld
as against the husband's creditors, the wife having acted
in good faith and without knowledge by her of any inten-
tion on the husband's part to defraud his creditors. The
Court of Appeals in the course of its opinion said:
"There is no question as to the sufficiency of mar-
riage as a consideration to support a pre-nuptial con-
veyance, even though it operates to the prejudice of
creditors, unless the grantee was implicated in a fraud
to be committed against their interest. ''6la
It is well settled in Maryland law, that where one spouse
goes into bankruptcy the trustee in bankruptcy takes no
interest in property held by the bankrupt and his spouse
as tenants by the entireties for, in this State, no interest
therein could have been transferred by the bankrupt to
61 Md. Code (1939).
', Braecklein v. McNamara, 147 Md. 17, 21, 127 A. 643 (1925).
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the trustee, or could have been levied upon or sold under
judicial process in satisfaction of his individual claim.62
As mentioned above, however, under Section 70a of
the Bankruptcy Act, if within six months following the
petition in bankruptcy, the bankrupt is divorced or his
wife dies, then such entirety property which may have
become converted as a result of these circumstances into
a tenancy in common or the sole ownership of the bank-
rupt, should pass to the trustee in bankruptcy.
There have been some curious developments in bank-
ruptcy as regards property held by tenants by the entireties
in Maryland. If a husband and wife, owning property as
tenants by the entireties go into individual bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy court, by the device of consolidating the
proceeding will pass the property to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy free of liens obtained by judicial proceedings within
the four months period prior to the petitions. In In re
Utz et ux,63 petitioner, on February 10, 1934, obtained a
judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Utz. On February 19, 1934,
Mr. Utz, a farmer, was adjudged bankrupt on a voluntary
petition. 4 On the same day Mrs. Utz was similarly ad-
judged bankrupt. On March 7, 1934, petitioner sought ex-
ecution by virtue of his judgment. On March 9, 1934, the
bankruptcy proceedings of both husband and wife were
consolidated by order of the bankruptcy court. The Court
held that since a trustee in bankruptcy is clothed with the
powers of a judgment creditor, a trustee in consolidated
bankruptcy proceedings should be clothed with the powers
of a joint judgment creditor of both the husband and the
wife. It follows, ruled the Court, that the property of the
husband and the wife in the present consolidated pro-
ceedings, held by them as tenants by the entireties, does
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy and that, therefore, the
judgment lien obtained by the petitioning creditor within
uFoland v. Hoffman, 47 A. (2d) 62 (Md. 1946); Dioguardi v. Curran,
35 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764
(C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; In Re Ford, 40 F. Supp. 955 (D. Md. 1941).
1 7 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1934).
'A farmer, as defined by The Bankruptcy Act, cannot be adjudicated an
involuntary bankrupt. There are two definitions of "farmer" in the Act,
Sec. 75 and Sec. 1 (17). Section 75 is the more recently enacted and probably
is the prevailing definition at the present time.
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four months of the adjudication in bankruptcy and the
consolidation of the proceedings is void as against the
trustee.
The same device of passing entireties property to the
trustee in bankruptcy by consolidating the individual pro-
ceedings of the husband and wife has been adopted by the
District Courts in Pennsylvania in In re Carpenter,65 and
in the matter of Pennell. 5a In the Carpenter case, the
Court adopts the opinion of the Referee, which seems to
this writer far from convincing both as to its reasoning
and the soundness of its conclusion. It is premised on the
theory that the husband and wife are to be treated not as
separate individuals in bankruptcy, but as "the bankrupt".
Granting this premise, which appears most faulty, then,
of course, it is clear sailing to the Referee's conclusion.
The Pennell case cites the Carpenter case and the Utz case,
and then merely says: "Our opinion is that when the estate
of the husband and wife came into court on separate ad-
judications in bankruptcy, the trustee takes the estate held
by them by entireties, but for convenience in administra-
tion, the two bankruptcy estates should be consolidated." 66
It is not clear to the writer just what the Court means
when it says "when the estate of the husband and wife
came into court on separate adjudications in bankruptcy".
Certainly if only the husband went into bankruptcy the
entireties estate did not come into court, and likewise if
only the wife went into bankruptcy the entireties estate
did not come into court. And if both go into bankruptcy
there seems to be no substantive reason why the entireties
estate should come into court. Mere consolidation of pro-
ceedings should not be the magic charm that brings the
entireties estate into court when the individual proceed-
ings would not have done so. And yet, the following two
Missouri cases clearly indicate that it is the consolidation
that effects this curious result.
5 F. Supp. 101 (M. D. Pa. 1933).
W& 30 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 611 (1935).
nbm4, 612.
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In Dickey v. Thompson," the Supreme Court of Missouri
held that when husband and wife, owning property as
tenants by the entireties were adjudged bankrupt the same
day in separate proceedings, and the same person was
appointed trustee for both bankrupt estates, this did not
make him trustee of the estate held by the bankrupts as
tenants by the entireties. The reasoning of the court in
this case seems very sound. However, in a subsequent
case, Shipman v. Fitzpatrick," the same Court, after re-
ferring to the earlier case, said:
"We might add that it seems to be the general rule
where both the husband and the wife are bankrupt
and the proceedings are consolidated, the trustee in
the consolidated proceedings takes title to the prop-
erty."69
These cases are of considerable interest. To the writer
it is not clear on what authority in law the courts have
jurisdiction to consolidate the bankruptcy proceedings of
two individuals merely because they are husband and wife.
There is no hint in the opinions that the husbands and
wives were partners in any business so as thus to cause
entirety property to pass to the trustee.7 ° Remington, a
'18 S. W. (2d) 388 (1929).
164 S. W. (2d) 912 (1942).
Ibid, 913. The Court cites 8 C. J. S., Bankruptcy, Sec. 175.
'The Bankruptcy Act apparently contemplates consolidation of proceed-
ings where partners and partnerships are in bankruptcy, see Section 5 and
32. There appears to be no express authority in the Act for consolidating
bankruptcy proceedings of non-partners. General Order in Bankruptcy
No. 37, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court: "In proceedings
under the Act the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Act
or with these general orders, be followed as nearly as may be . . ."
U. S. C. A. Title 28, Sec. 734 "Orders to save costs; consolidation of
causes of like nature. When causes of a like nature or relative to the
same question are pending before a court of the United States, or of any
Territory, the court may make such orders and rules concerning proceed-
ings therein as may be conformable to the usages of Courts for avoiding
unnecessary costs or delay in the administering of justice, and may con-
solidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so."
Rule 81 (a) (1) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "These rules do
not apply to proceedings in admiralty. They do not apply to proceedings
in bankruptcy or proceedings in copyright under the Act of March 4,
1909 . . . , except insofar as they may be made applicable thereto by
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States .. "
Rule 42 (a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Consolidation. When
actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
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writer on bankruptcy,' says: "Where husband and wife
both go into bankruptcy, their cases are sometimes consoli-
dated. This is particularly desirable where the estates
consist in part of property, owned jointly or by the entire-
ties." As authority he notes In re Miller.72 But in this case,
except for the statement of fact in the first sentence of the
opinion, "The bankrupts were husband and wife, whose
causes were consolidated in the District Court," there is
no consideration of, nor question raised as to, the authority
of the District Court to order such a consolidation.
If the two individual proceedings had not been consoli-
dated, following the ruling in Ades v. Caplin,3 the judg-
ment lien on the property would have been treated as void
as to the husband and, similarly, as to the wife, and the
property would not have passed to their respective indi-
vidual trustees. They would have come out of their re-
spective bankruptcies owning this property free and clear
of the judgment lien and it would have been invulnerable
to attack by their individual creditors. Instead of this
result, however, by the procedural device of consolidating
the proceedings we find the property passes to the trustee
in bankruptcy. Presumably, it will then be liquidated,
and the proceeds therefrom will be used to pay dividends
to their individual creditors (who could not have touched
the property before bankruptcy) as well as their joint
creditors. But if the court marshalled the assets, entirety
property would be used first for joint claims, and indi-
vidual property first for individual claims, and then the
joint creditor would be taken care of first out of the en-
tireties property even though his lien was voided. The
windfall given individual creditors by the device of con-
solidation in bankruptcy is apparent.
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
It seems to the writer highly doubtful that these various provisions were
intended to authorize the consolidation of two separate bankruptcy pro-
ceedings by individuals, be they husband and wife or not.
1934 Supp., Sec. 338. 10 (new).
"95 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), 36 A. M. B. R. (N. S.) 361.
132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94 (1918).
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It could be a subject of speculation as to what a court
would do if, in a case similar to In re Utz et ux,4 the wife
did not file her petition in bankruptcy until more than four
months after the judgment lien on the entireties property
was obtained. It is respectfully suggested that the result
flowing from the consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings
of husband and wife, not partners, as exemplified in the
above cases, should be reexamined.
Another curious development in bankruptcy law grows
out of the following series of cases.
In Frey v. McGaw,75 defendant-creditor obtained a judg-
ment against Mr. and Mrs. Frey on April 3, 1913, and this
became a lien on certain leasehold property which they
held as tenants by the entireties. On February 11, 1914
(about ten months later) Mr. Frey filed a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy. Subsequently, with the permission
of the District Court, defendant-creditor directed the writ
of fieri facias to issue from the state court and levy was
made on the property. Mr. Frey, the bankrupt, then filed
a bill to restrain proceedings under the writ. Defend-
ant's demurrer to the bill was sustained by the lower
court. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court,
held that the judgment, being against the joint defendants,
husband and wife, was itself an entirety. The Court said
that it has never been held in Maryland that, in the absence
of statutory exemption, where there is an entire judgment
against joint-defendants, no lien is imposed upon estates
or interests in land held by the entireties. The Court de-
cided the judgment lien of the defendants was not void
under Section 6776 of the Bankruptcy Act, as it had been
entered more than four months prior to the petition for
adjudication of bankruptcy. Nor was it void for any reason
in its obtention. The discharge of the bankrupt was only
personal to the debtor. It was entirely without effect as
to any valid liens subsisting at the time.
S upra, n. 63.
127 Md. 23, 95 A. 960 (1915).
'11 U. S. C. A. 204.
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This case was followed by Ades v. Caplin,7 where a
creditor obtained a judgment on August 23, 1915 against
a husband and wife who owned a leasehold interest as
tenants by the entireties. About four weeks later (Sep-.
tember 16, 1915) an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
was filed against the husband and he was adjudicated bank-
rupt. A composition with the creditors was worked out
in bankruptcy, this was confirmed and the husband was
given his discharge. The judgment creditor received a
dividend of $41.37. In 1917, after the bankrupt received
his discharge, the creditor had a fieri facias issued on his
judgment, and levy was made on the leasehold property.
Husband and wife filed a bill to restrain the creditor and
the sheriff from selling the property under the writ. The
lower court restrained the sale and this was affirmed on
appeal. The Court of Appeals quoted from Section 67fPs of
the Bankruptcy Act, as it was then written, and said:
"Under the above statute, the lien of the judgment
recovered against the appellees within four months
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against
one of them, became null and void, at least so far as
the bankrupt was concerned, and it must be so held,
unless there is something in the characteristics of an
estate by the entirety that would require a different
meaning to be given to the Act....
"... upon the filing of the aforesaid petition within
the period mentioned above, the lien of the judgment,
so far at least as the right of the husband in the estate
by entirety was concerned, was struck down by the
provisions of the Federal Act, the effect of which was
practically the same as if the judgment had been re-
covered against the wife alone, in which case the said
leasehold property could not have been sold during
the lifetime of the husband if at all, under an execution
issued on the judgment."79
We shall presently see, that if the creditor in this case
had been less diligent, had slept on his rights, and had not
7 Supra, n. 73.
7136 Stat. 842.
7. Supra, n. 73, 69. For recent cases where the court refused to strike
down a judgment lien on entirety property obtained within four months of
petition in bankruptcy, the bankrupt having waived exemptions, see Citizens
Savings Bank, Inc. v. Astrin, 61 A. (2d) 419 (Del. 1948).
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prosecuted his claim to judgment until after a petition
in bankruptcy had been filed, he would have been able to
satisfy his claim out of this property. The logical symmetry
of this proposition is certainly not apparent to this writer,
but it nevertheless appears to be the present state of the
law.
Thus, in Phillips v. Krakower,0 Phillips was adjudged
bankrupt on January 9, 1930. At the time of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy he and his wife owned as tenants
by the entireties certain property in Baltimore City.
Krakower, a creditor, held a note of the husband and wife
for $5,500. At the time of the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings this claim had not been reduced to
judgment. On February 21, 1930 the creditor filed a petition
in the bankruptcy proceeding, praying that Phillips' dis-
charge in bankruptcy be deferred to enable him to secure
a judgment on the note, and to subject to its satisfaction
the property held as tenants by the entireties. The bank-
ruptcy court so ordered and it was affirmed on appeal.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, among other things, said:
"... in case of bankruptcy, the interest of the bank-
rupt in such an estate does not pass to his trustee for
the benefit of creditors .... Where, however, husband
and wife execute a joint note, the estate by entireties
can be subjected to judgment thereon obtained against
both of them. Frey v. McGraw, supra. But if the lia-
bility on the note of one of the spouses be discharged
in bankruptcy, a judgment on the note against the
other cannot be collected out of the property during
the lifetime of the first. Ades v. Caplin, supra.
". . although the bankruptcy proceeding has
brought no interest in the estate by entireties into
court for the benefit of the creditors of Phillips, his
discharge in bankruptcy will remove that entire prop-
erty beyond the reach of creditors entitled to subject
it to their claims. The question is presented whether,
without giving these creditors an opportunity to pro-
ceed, the court should grant the discharge knowing
that it will result in a legal fraud, i.e., the effectual
withdrawing of the property from the reach of those
46F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
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entitled to subject it to their claims, for the beneficial
ownership and possession of those who created the
claims against it. We cannot conceive that any court
would lend its aid to the accomplishment of a result
so shocking to the conscience.
"The purpose of the bankruptcy act was to equitably
distribute the assets of distressed debtors among their
creditors and to discharge them from further liability
after this had been done. It was never contemplated
that it should be used to perpetrate fraud or to shield
assets from creditors. It is elementary that a bankrupt
is not entitled to a discharge unless and until he has
honestly surrendered his assets for the benefit of credi-
tors; and he certainly is not in a position to ask of a
court of bankruptcy, which is a court of equity, to
grant him a discharge under the statute, when the effect
of the discharge will be to withdraw from the reach
of creditors property properly applicable to the satis-
faction of their claims.""'
If it is "legal fraud", and "shocking to the conscience",
one cannot help but wonder what to think of the law as
promulgated in Ades v. Caplin82 (and cited in the Phillips
case). The only substantial difference on the facts is, that
in Ades v. Caplin, the joint creditor reduced his claim to
judgment within four months of the petition in bankruptcy,
while in the Phillips case he did not go to that trouble until
after the petition was filed. A legal situation is thus created
by this series of cases whereby the joint creditor if he
reduces his claim to judgment will have his lien on entire-
ties property voided if the debtor within four months
thereafter files a petition in bankruptcy. If the creditor
holds off taking action to obtain judgment for fear of
having his lien voided by bankruptcy and waits for the
debtor to file a voluntary petition or to have an involuntary
petition filed against him, the creditor may have to wait
indefinitely without collecting on his claim, not to mention
the possibility of having it barred by limitations.
We find this same curious result recognized in the fairly
recent case of Foland v. Hoffman.8" On May 18, 1934,
-Ibie, 765.
3Supra, n. 73.
U47A. (2d) 62 (Md. 1946).
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Foland and wife signed a confessed judgment note, under
seal, for $3,200. On April 8, 1938 Foland was adjudged a
bankrupt. On September 16, 1944, the holder of the note
had judgment entered against the husband and wife. On
October 11, 1944 Foland received his discharge in bank-
ruptcy, and on October 14, 1944 he filed his plea of discharge
in the confessed judgment case. The lower court passed
an order that sufficient cause had not been shown to vacate
the judgment. On appeal this was. affirmed. The Court,
in the course of its opinion said: "A discharge in bank-
ruptcy does not affect liens theretofore existing against real
or personal property, title to which is held by the entireties,
unless acquired within four months prior to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, and while the bankrupt was
insolvent."8 4 The opinion cited Ades v. Caplin,5 and Frey v.
McGaw. 6 The Court then stated: -"He (Foland) was dis-
charged on October 16, 1944, which was after the judgment
had been entered and hence his discharge would not
constitute cause to strike out the judgment in question
as to him."'  The Court also quoted from Phillips v.
Krakower,s8 i.e., the part of the opinion about legal fraud.
Assuming the bankrupt was insolvent during the four
months prior to the petition in bankruptcy, which is not
a broad assumption, if the creditor in this case had been
more diligent and obtained his judgment in the period
December 8, 1937 - April 8, 1938 his lien would have been
voided. By doing nothing until September 16, 1944 he
established a lien that was good. The courts say that not
to permit the establishment of this lien would be "legal
fraud". Although all the opinions referred to above indicate
the courts are aware of this situation, the interesting thing
to the writer is that there is no hint in the opinions that
the courts consider such a situation as incongruous.
It is suggested that the curious and illogical results
discussed above would be eliminated if Section 67 of the
- Ibid, 69.
"Supra, n. 73.
'e Supra, n. 75.
7Supra, n. 83, 66.
"Supra, n. 80.
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Bankruptcy Act were construed to avoid liens only on
property passing to the trustee in bankruptcy as part of
the estate for the benefit of creditors, but not to affect liens
on property not passing to the trustee. The difficulty here,
is that the United States Supreme Court, 9 in construing
Section 67F, of the Bankruptcy Act, in 1913 decided that
all liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person
who is insolvent within four months of bankruptcy are null
and void whether title to the property vests in the trustee
or, as in the case of exempt property, title does not vest in
the trustee. The Court said:
"On this question there is a difference of opinion,
some state and Federal courts holding that the Bank-
ruptcy Act was intended to protect the creditors' trust
fund and not the bankrupt's own property and that,
therefore, liens against exempt property were not an-
nulled even though obtained by legal proceedings with-
in four months of filing the petition (citing cases). On
the other hand (citing cases) hold that section 67F
annuls all such liens, both as against the property which
the trustee takes and that which may be set aside to
the bankrupt.
"... This view, we think, is supported both by the
language of the section and the general policy of the
act which was intended not only to secure equality
among creditors, but for the benefit of the debtor in
discharging him from all liabilities and enabling him
to start afresh with the property set apart to him as
exempt. Both of these objects would be defeated if
judgments like the present were not annulled, for
otherwise the two Iowa plaintiffs would not only obtain
a preference over other creditors, but would take prop-
erty which it was the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
to secure to the debtor.
"Barring exceptional cases, which are specially pro-
vided for, the policy of the act is to fix a four month's
period in which a creditor cannot obtain an advantage
over other creditors nor a lien against the debtor's
property. 'All liens obtained by legal proceedings' with-
in that period are declared null and void...' ,9
' Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hall, 229 U. S. 511 (1913).
'
0 Ibid.
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It is submitted that there is nothing in the language
of the present Section 67A, which in 1938 superseded the
old Section 67F, that would be a basis for saying that the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Hall"' is not still apposite. If these
conclusions are correct, then it would seem that the illogical
situation of voiding a lien obtained through legal proceed-
ings within four months of bankruptcy on property held as
tenants by the entireties but permitting a joint creditor to
proceed to obtain a lien on such property after bankruptcy
by holding up the bankrupt's discharge can only be rem-
edied by an appropriate amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
"1Supra, 89.
